I'm Thomas Friedman and I think...hard.

As my colleague and current couchmate Trevor Timm pointed out, it is ironic that today of all days I have chosen to compile the definitive collection of hilarious Thomas Friedman takedowns. Why today, you ask? Because today Thomas Friedman actually made sense. Mull that one over for a moment. It’s okay, take your time.

As anyone who has seen me speak publicly knows, I delight in nothing more than a good jab at ol’ Friedman. And just because he’s written one intelligent piece doesn’t mean I’m going to stop…so, in traditional JCY style, I have compiled The Definitive Collection of Thomas Friedman Takedowns, an immaculate collection of parodies, jabs, and totally straightfaced teardowns of the Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist.

As I’m sure more fantastic gems will eventually come our way, I will later issue a boxed set, then perhaps a B-side. But for now, here goes:

1. Matt Taibbi’s seminal takedown, “Flathead”. It has style, it has pizzazz, it has the sentence “On an ideological level, Friedman’s new book is the worst, most boring kind of middlebrow horseshit.”  It is a classic work of art, and Taibbi’s writing, the anti-Friedman.  You’re welcome.
2. Sarah Carr’s “This is just the start and it never fucking ends.” Perhaps you didn’t expect an Egyptian blogger to come in second place.  But lo!  Who better to tear apart Friedman’s Egypt inanities than the blogger who writes Inanities, an Egyptian who actually protested in Tahrir Square?  Key line: “You might ask why, since I am in Egypt, I don’t ask an Egyptian – possibly two Egyptians – about what inspired them to completely ignore my theories on the Arab peoples and take to the streets. The answer is this: I am Thomas Friedman and I write a column in the New York Times.”
3. “Thomas Freetrademan”‘s “The Datsun and the Shoe Tree.” Some people name-drop, Friedman place-drops.  This parody captures his essence–”What’s my point? I don’t actually have one–but opening my columns with strings of clichéd cultural juxtapositions really cuts down my workload”–perfectly.
4. Andrew Ferguson’s book review of “That Used to be Us.” Opening of second paragraph: “As a writer, Mr. Friedman is best known for his galloping assaults on Strunk and White’s Rule No. 9: “Do Not Affect a Breezy Manner.”  ‘Nuff said.
5. Daniel Drezner’s “Suffering from Friedman’s Disease in Beijing.” If Foreign Policy were Weekend Update.  A classic parody.
6. The New York Observer’s “Write your own Thomas Friedman column.” A paint-by-numbers to writing Friedman-style.  Includes gems such as “Thomas Friedman is the Carrie Bradshaw of current events. Think Sex and the City , write ‘Sects and Tikriti.’”
7. Matt Taibbi’s “Flat N All That.” What could be better than a Taibbi takedown?  Two Taibbi takedowns!  “I’ve been unhealthily obsessed with Thomas Friedman for more than a decade now,” admits Taibbi.  “Good!” reply us.
8. Joshua Foust’s “The Toms Talk ISAF Raids” and “The Only Way to Discuss This“ (tie).  There’s only one thing better than a Tom Friedman monologue, and that’s a Tom Friedman/Tom Ricks dialogue.  If I didn’t know any better, I’d say Foust was probably high while writing these, but consider that a good thing.  Complete with sleep-mask-wearing-Andrew-Sullivan intervention.
9. Justin E.H. Smith’s “Thomas Friedman Clogged My Toilet.” A subtle, creeping parody full of toilet humor and complete with an appearance by a long-dead Mike Royko.
10. Michael Sweeney’s “Create Your Own Thomas Friedman Op-Ed Column.” Not only is it delightfully condescending (a Friedman must!) but includes the choose-your-own-adventure style multiple choice technique that Friedman’s columns sometimes seemingly employ.

Serious Critiques:

Not exactly B-sides, the following is a list of the more serious critiques of Friedman. Equally enjoyable to the true connoisseur, but less punchy and certainly not Thomas Friedman takedown party reading material.  Wait, you don’t have Thomas Friedman takedown parties?  Ah, nevermind.

1. Belén Fernández’s “Thomas Friedman’s Confusions.” Frankly, Fernández deserves more than an honorable mention, given that she actually wrote the book on Friedman, but since I haven’t read it yet (c’mon, Nook store!), I’ll just say of her aforementioned piece: Brilliant. (Update! Excerpt of book now available!)
2. Greg Marx’s “Tom Friedman’s ‘Radical’ Wrongness.” The inclusion of Marx’s piece is almost meta, as he compiled within this post the first collection of Friedman takedowns.  And oh, it’s so sweet.
   
3. Matt Welch’s “The Simpletons.” Scathing, accurate, and references Taibbi. See also: “Capturing Tom Friedman.”
4. Steve Benen’s “Has Thomas Friedman met Barack Obama?“ Pointing out Friedman’s lack of originality and occasional outright disingenuousness.

Honorable Mentions:

1. Daniel Drezner’s “If world politics pundits covered the Women’s World Cup.” The whole thing is a delightful read, but as only one graf is dedicated to Friedmanism, an honorable mention it gets.  Bonus points for the loving yet punchy parody of Glenn Greenwald.
2. Dan Murphy‘s fact-check of Friedman’s January 2012 Cairo speech. Though Murphy tweeted that the piece was “de-snarked” (presumably by editors), it still makes its point.
3. Jennifer Rubin’s “Thomas Friedman, hitting rock bottom.” The best part of Rubin’s recent critique of Friedman in which she implies that Friedman sits upon an anti-Israel perch?  She’s totally fucking serious.

Bonus Points:

• Matt Welch, Friedman bête noire extraordinaire, offers up an artistic reenactment of a Friedman column, complete with robots.
  

Social Media Wars

I’ve spent the past few months documenting the tactics of the Syrian Electronic Army and other factions in respect to spreading propaganda to counter anti-opposition sentiment (you can find my writing on the SEA here, here, and here; and an interview with NPR here). I’ve mainly focused on the utility of hacktivism in awareness-raising, with some emphasis on the effectiveness of flooding the dominant media narrative for the purpose of gaining attention for the other side (in this case, the pro-regime side), but what I haven’t touched on is the longer-term effect these tactics are having on people both in-country and outside, as well as where this type of activity fits in the broader landscape of online activism in the region.

I’ll say a few things up front. First off, that these heavy propaganda tactics on social networks are unique to three countries in the region: Syria, Bahrain, and in a different sense, Israel. Let’s ignore the third one for a moment; primarily because its impact is less dangerous, but I’ll nonetheless touch upon it later, because I think its tactics are relevant.

Syria and Bahrain are in many ways two very different cases. While the regime in Syria has at this point been widely condemned and sanctioned (after months and months), Bahrain still enjoys support from the United States and other Western countries, with no end in sight. The state of the Internet in the two countries is also extremely different: While Bahrain enjoys Internet penetration in the high 80% range, Syria’s access remains below 20%. Syria’s uprising has gone on now for nearly eight months, while Bahrain’s has ebbed and flowed. Both countries have nonetheless employed harsh tactics against Internet users, filtering opposition websites and arresting dissenting bloggers.

There is one major similarity between the two countries that often goes unmentioned in mainstream coverage: in both countries, opinion on the ground–and online–is divided. Some bloggers seem hesitant to dwell too much on this; and I, while cognizant of it, am not entirely educated of the reasons. I therefore won’t go deeply into the reasons, though it’s obvious that some are purely sectarian, while others are a result of individuals benefiting from the regimes. It is also, therefore, worth noting that Bahrain and Syria are both controlled by minorities: Bahrain by its Sunni minority (estimated at less than 20% compared to the Shi’a majority estimated at 70%), and Syria by its Alawi minority (Sunnis make up nearly 74% of Syria, Alawis are estimated to comprise 10%).

Countries Divided

The fact of divided opinion differentiates Syria and Bahrain greatly from Egypt and Tunisia on several levels. Online, anyone closely following the blogospheres of those four countries would be well aware of that fact. Whereas the Egyptian blogosphere has been divided for years upon various political lines (e.g., leftists, secularists, Muslim Brotherhood, etc), it has always had one thing in common: disgust for the Mubarak regime. The Tunisian blogosphere, though I don’t know it as well, was similar in its attitude toward Ben Ali.

The Bahraini and Syrian blogospheres, both of which I’ve followed for quite some time, are diverse. In Syria, there has always been a pocket of dissenters, from those willing to speak out harshly against the regime to those who raise more specific points, such as its heavy control over the Internet. There have also always been a range of other views, from those favoring reform to those who outright support the regime to those who choose not to speak of it.

A Protester in Bahrain holds up a sign that reads "No Shia and no Sunni. We are all against the exclusivists."

Of course, as I mentioned, both countries are also divided on the ground. Syria’s pro-regime rallies have become infamous (warning: links to SANA), while Bahrainis in favor of the monarchy also responded with rallies of their own.

Keeping in mind the background, it becomes a bit easier to analyze the (online) events of this year.

The Propaganda Wars

In February, New York Times journalist Nick Kristof visited Bahrain and tweeted about his observations, re-telling the stories of victims and later wrote a column about his experience in the country. Almost immediately, he was hit with accusations of bias on Twitter, as well as petition directed at his Times editor urging him to be let go. Later, the tweets turned uglier, as Kristof was hit with death threats.

Over the course of the next few months, the Bahraini Twitter trolling continued, and was soon followed by a similar phenomenon in Syria. While Bahraini Twitter trolling was organized from the very beginning, with apparent individuals targeting specific commentary, in Syria it was a different story; most trolls appeared to be automated feeds targeting the #Syria hashtag in an attempt to flood it, not with misinformation, but with irrelevant information. Though some individuals, such as myself, were targeted directly (and with my own Flickr photos of Syria, no less), Twitter’s infrastructure makes it relatively easy to block and report accounts for spam, and while many remained up, most were removed from search, making it easier for those using the #Syria hashtag to follow events on the platform.

Flooding the #Syria hashtag with irrelevant content

While Syrian online propaganda is likely state-sponsored (in some way or another) and has utilized a variety of platforms, from the hackings of Harvard University and other websites, to the retaliatory defacement of Anonplus, to spamming Facebook accounts of celebrities and politicians, and smear sites like the Plot Against Syria, Bahrain’s has remained largely on Twitter, and appears to be largely the work of individuals.

Amira Al Hussaini receives a threat from a Bahraini Twitter troll

For some, the Bahraini trolling appears to be effective, at the very least in silencing opposition voices abroad. For each tweet using the Bahrain hashtag, as I noted last week at #AB11, the Twitter user will receive a flood of tweets, and many seem to have decided it simply isn’t worth the hassle. The propaganda therefore succeeds. Of course, Bahrain is also employing a slew of other propaganda tactics, such as placing opinion pieces in American newspapers with the help of American communications firms. Not that they need it, of course. The State Department is all too willing to uphold the Bahraini regime.

In Syria, I’d say it’s a different story. The majority of the efforts are so sloppy and ineffectual that they’re unlikely to convince anyone of their

Your propaganda isn't very effective, sir.

In the end, however, propaganda is just a distraction. It is effective, perhaps, in silencing voices, but the real threats are on the ground and in the tensions in those two countries between opposition and regime supporters. Nevertheless, it makes sense to continue studying it–perhaps by more quantitative means–to understand its effects both on the ground and in terms of external support.

Addendum: Israel

I mentioned Israel in a note at the beginning of my piece. While I don’t think that it fits into the context of this piece, I have seen considerable efforts, both by Israeli companies like Ahava and–apparently–government-supported groups, to utilize some of the same techniques as Syria and Bahrain, particularly on Twitter. Just a few days ago, one account (called @freemiddleeast and associated with this website) tweeted to me after I used the word “Palestine,” indicating that it was using automated software to target certain search terms. The account was quickly blocked for spamming, to Twitter’s credit, but others remain.

I have no idea why Ahava thinks this is effective.

Israel, like–perhaps–Syria, also pays individuals to generate propaganda, which is apparent from some of the accounts that have targeted me (they’re rife with misspellings and often, total misinformation).

Of course, Israel is not alone in its attempts. The US State Department has its own team that targets “inaccurate speech” in Urdu, Arabic, and Farsi (to their credit, however, their paid propagandists are required to identify as such), and earlier this year it was revealed that CENTCOM would undertake similar, less transparent efforts. Thus far, I’m not aware of any other democratic states engaging in such practices, however.

Conclusion

It’s hard to say what long-term effects online propaganda from the aforementioned countries might have. At an event last month, Alec Ross (Senior Advisor for Innovation to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) proclaimed that the days of (traditional) propaganda were over. I disagreed with him, noting the online attempts at propaganda, and while he assented, I suspected that the administration views these types of propaganda as different from those of, say, state television. I do not. I think the pervasiveness and the distributed nature of social media propaganda makes it potentially more dangerous for its targets, as it creates a gang mentality and allows for the smearing of far more individuals than state media would ever make time for.

Of course, I’m obviously only tipping the iceberg with this post. I’m attempting to raise awareness of this phenomenon in the hopes that someone will take it on as a study, and would be happy to discuss further with anyone with interest.

“The page… began as a call for peaceful protest, even though it used a term that has been associated with violence in the past. In addition, the administrators initially removed comments that promoted violence,” the company statement said. “However, after the publicity of the page, more comments deteriorated to direct calls for violence. Eventually, the administrators also participated in these calls. After administrators of the page received repeated warnings about posts that violated our policies, we removed the page.”

——
Original post:

It appears that today, Facebook has removed a page calling for a Third Intifada; unfortunately, the page is not the same one I referred to in my previous post (that one, and several others, remain online), and so I am unable to comment on the actual contents of the page. Haaretz reports that the Page contained the following vile statement: “Judgment Day will be brought upon us only once the Muslims have killed all of the Jews”. If this is true, its removal was justified; but there are still questions to be asked:

1) Was it the Page admins calling for violence or a member of the Page (if the latter, the member should be deactivated, not the Page) and

2) Was it an actual call to incite violence (update: in this case it appears to have been; in other cases, this is a question to ask)? If so, removing the Page is justified. If not, it isn’t.

That said, I do have another concern here. In numerous occasions, including this one, I’ve spotted Pages and Groups on Facebook set up with a single purpose in mind: to identify and report users whom members disagree with. In this case, there remains a group called “Join the effort to delete the group Third Palestinian Intifada” (I should note that it appears the page has been taken over from its original purpose at this point).

I’ve seen situations like this before, and occasionally, they’ve been moderately effective: Last year, a friend in Morocco, who identifies as an atheist, had his account deactivated for unknown reasons. Later, we found that a group had intentionally been set up for reporting–specifically–Arab atheists. In the content of the group, I found that users had specifically called for members to report people for using pseudonyms, knowing that it’s difficult to appeal if one’s account is deleted for that reason.

On the other hand, there are Facebook Pages, such as this one, set up for reporting genuine hate speech. As far as I can tell, they’re not encouraging abuse of the system; but knowing how Facebook’s systems work, is intentionally seeking out content to report abusive behavior? Or is it justified?

Now, I will say this: It is entirely possible that the group I didn’t see was promoting violence. And if it was, I believe its removal was justified, by sheer definition of Facebook’s TOS. It is unfortunately unclear, and will probably remain so, as Facebook is not wont to comment on specific cases.

On this Facebook page there are posted many remarks and movie clips which call for the killing of Israelis and Jews and the “liberating” of Jerusalem and of Palestine through acts of violence.

Edelstein goes on to claim that believes in the value free speech, but that there is a difference between freedom of expression and incitement to violence.

Where do I start?  First off, I agree with Edelstein’s latter claim in theory; there is indeed a difference between free expression and incitement.  That said, I’ve pored through the contents of the Facebook Page, and while there may be individual comments that can or should be perceived as incitement, I have not yet come across incitement by the Page organizers.  In that case, individuals should be dealt with on an individual basis, and their accounts removed if they are indeed violating Facebook’s Terms of Service.

While I view Cohen’s call for removal of the Page as an abuse of Facebook (she specifically asked users to report the page as a TOS violation), Edelstein’s call is not so much an abuse of Facebook as an example of a politician overstepping existing frameworks in an attempt to curb free expression.  What Edelstein did is not unlike what Senator Joe Lieberman did when he called for Amazon to remove Wikileaks from its servers.

My own political leanings aside, I very much believe that the best way to counter offensive speech is with more speech.  I understand why the page calling for a third Palestinian Intifada is offensive to some, just like I understand why the “Everybody Draw Mohammed Day” page is offensive to others.  Nevertheless, both pages are protected under the First Amendment, and both pages–unless they actually commit incitement to violence–should remain places for controversial speech.

Update: Further testing by EFF International Activist Eva Galperin found that, in addition to Arab countries and Iran, Myanmar, Nigeria, Kazahstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are also affected.

This morning, a Syrian Hotmail user noted that he could not turn on HTTPS on Hotmail. At closer look, we learned that the user was actually in Jordan, and had his Hotmail location set to Jordan as well…and yet he was still blocked from turning on the “use HTTPS automatically” setting.

Specifically, Microsoft Hotmail’s HTTPS feature states that turning on HTTPS will work for Hotmail over the Web, but will cause errors through external programs.  Users can still force HTTPS temporarily, for a given page.  We have confirmed that users in some of the countries below are able to force HTTPS (either by typing it in manually or using a program like HTTPS Everywhere, however, we cannot confirm that this works for everyone, or on all pages).  In any case, it’s imperative that users have access to encryption all the time.

Replicating the Error

I quickly created a Hotmail account to see if I could replicate the situation; sure enough, when I set my location to the United States, I could turn on HTTPS as a setting, but when I switched to Jordan, I could not. I tested several other Arab countries–Syria, Bahrain, Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria–also no HTTPS. I then tested Guatemala, Israel, and Turkey: all fine. France, German: fine. Iran…no HTTPS.

To replicate or test for the error yourself, log in to your Hotmail account and set your location, then try to turn on HTTPS.

The message received by users with their settings turned to one of the aforementioned countries is: Your Windows Live ID can’t use HTTPS automatically because this feature is not available for your account type.

…in which “account type” = Arab/Iranian.

Incidentally, users in the aforementioned countries are able to easily change their location setting to the United States (or another country) and then successfully turn on HTTPS. It is therefore interesting that, whatever Microsoft’s reasons for barring users from HTTPS, they chose not to enforce by IP address.

By contrast, Yahoo mail does not offer HTTPS, while Gmail enforces HTTPS by default in all countries.

This isn’t the first time Microsoft has acted prejudicially toward Arab users: In 2010, my colleague Helmi Noman at the OpenNet Initiative discovered that Microsoft’s Bing was blocking Arabic-speaking users (e.g., those using the Arabic-language/Arab countries version of Bing) from searching for certain terms, mostly related to sexual content.

For activists, there are two courses of action: Either change your location to a country that will allow you to enforce HTTPS or switch to Gmail or another secure service.

As for Microsoft, we’ve let them know about the situation.  It is my hope that this is a mistake and will soon be corrected.  I’ll keep you posted.

Let me start off by acknowledging two points:

• He is a journalist that criticizes Syria’s Baath regime, Hezbollah, Libya’s Qaddafi.  Wrong as it may be, it’s somewhat shocking that he thought Syria would just let him in the country in with no fuss.  He strikes me as incredibly naive.
• His points about Syria and Libya are well-taken.  Both have a long way to go before they can be considered democratic in the most basic sense, and we should by no means ignore their human rights violations, including imprisonment (and in the case of Libya, murder) of journalists.

If Eldin had stopped there; if he had simply been criticizing the restrictions placed on free speech by Arab regimes, I might have condoned the piece, even retweeted it — or perhaps it would have gone unnoticed.  But then he said this:

Failing to find a glimpse of hope across the greater Arab world, we must concede that Israel has become the only “safe haven” where one can be sure of his life and dignity.

Ah yes – Israel as a safe haven.  Unless you’re Jared Malsin, perhaps — Malsin is the American journalist whom Israel deported because he was working for the Palestinian Maan News Agency.  Or if you’re a journalist aboard the Mavi Marmara — their photographs, videos, and documents were seized, with some used by Israeli authorities without permission.  Or if you’re international news agency Al Jazeera, barred by the IDF from covering nonviolent protests in the West Bank.  Or if you’re a Palestinian journalist documenting Israeli violations of the right to assemble — four were attacked by the IDF this past January for covering protests in Burin.  And the list goes on…

Eldin also writes:

Just like the Palestinian Helles family who fled Hamas “jihadists” in Gaza to Israel, I foresee a time when millions of Arabs might stand humbly in front of IDF soldiers, begging for protection.

So, I urge you, dear fellow Arab, to visit Israel.

Everything about these two sentences is problematic.  First, there’s the issue of the Helles family; they did indeed flee Gaza to Israel.  A pro-Fatah “clan” (as the media would designate them), 181 members of the Helles family sought refuge in Israel; 80 or so were sent to the West Bank, while 60 were sent back to Gaza.  I’m fuzzy on the details, but then again, I presume that Eldin might be as well — the media alternately reported the Helles clan as having attacked Hamas or been attacked — in either case, it was hardly a humanitarian effort on Israel’s part.

As for the final sentence, the urging of Eldin’s “dear fellow Arabs” to visit Israel, perhaps it’s a nice sentiment, but it appears Eldin is (once again) missing out on some facts: Arabs (and some non-Arabs) who fly to Israel hoping to visit the West Bank (either alone or in addition to a visit to Israel proper) are frequently denied access, either entirely, or by receipt of a Palestinian Authority-only visa.

Israel is, by a number of measures, freer than a number of its neighbors.  But it is neither the region’s “safe haven” nor a true democracy.  Journalists in Israel and the land it occupies are hardly freer than Lebanon.  There is of course so much more to say on the subject, and I’m looking forward to reading whomever writes it.

Note: Of course Israel is promoting Eldin’s piece on its Arabic-language Foreign Ministry site.  Even though they know Arabs will never be able to enter the country in droves as Eldin suggests they ought to.  Because image is everything, right?

As Mondoweiss pointed out last week, the report puts forth the (rather unsurprising) findings that Palestinian social media users are educated and primarily use Arabic online, and that the Palestinian Internet is largely uncensored.  All true, certainly.  The report also found that, generally, Palestinians have an overwhelmingly negative view of Israel, that Israel has no genuine interest in the peace process, and that the two-state solution is “on its deathbed.”  Also unsurprising.  There were, of course, more specific findings, but I’m more concerned about the policy recommendations.

The first two recommendations acknowledge that the Palestinian online environment should not be taken lightly be policymakers, and suggest that more intensive study of the environment should be undertaken to get a better feel for what Palestinians think.  Fair enough.

The third recommendation, however, is incredibly troubling when looked at in detail.  The researchers recommend that the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team become more engaged in Palestinian online discourse.  I had the pleasure of meeting one of the people involved with the team at this year’s Al Jazeera Media Forum.  I was pleased, actually, to see such an attempt to engage with them.  What the Outreach team does is engage in conversations online in Persian, Arabic, and Urdu in attempt to “correct misinformation.”  They sign all of their messages with “digitaloutreach@state.gov” and are required to be transparent in their conversations.  Though I’m personally not a fan of this approach–I can’t imagine it’s terribly effective at changing people’s minds–I also think it’s relatively harmless.

The Foundation’s researchers, however, would prefer the Outreach Team not identify themselves a la China’s 50 cent army:

FDD’s research found that, during the nine-week observation period, the State Department’s efforts to influence the online discussions were largely ineffective. This may stem from the fact that the team is small in number, and cannot possibly challenge even a plurality of the views expressed on sites where sentiments run counter to U.S. objectives. However, it also may stem from a process whereby the engagement team has the odds stacked against it. Indeed, the Digital Outreach Team identified itself in every online interaction, which nearly always drew fire from users with a pre-existing bias against the United States.
To be effective, the outreach team must not advertise its presence. More importantly, it must launch a broader campaign to limit and discredit violent messages, expose Palestinian extremists on the Internet, and thwart their ability to gain credibility. This will require a more aggressive approach than the one currently employed. It may also require additional personnel.

The Digital Outreach Team should also be viewed as an important source of intelligence. Indeed, they regularly assess sentiments expressed online in the same way that Foreign Service Officers assess political sentiments on the ground. As such, they can add an additional window of understanding into the Palestinian political landscape. To this end, they could participate more actively in conversation threads and pose specific questions on a range of topics. This will allow them to assess opinions on a range of issues with a higher degree of focus, nuance, and specificity more commonly gauged by polling.
State Department decision-makers can benefit from these findings. For example, if anti-peace sentiment is running high online, an understanding of these sentiments could inform the decisions of State Department officials responsible for advising the White House and briefing Congress on peace talks or other diplomatic initiatives.

Let’s ignore for the moment the disingenuous definition of “anti-peace sentiment” and focus solely on the recommendation at hand.  What we have here is a lobby group that purports to promote democracy suggesting that the United States government manipulate Palestinian conversations in an attempt to “win the hearts and minds” of the Palestinian people…secretly.

The fear, of course, is that the State Department might take this seriously; after all, FDD credits itself with pushing them to shut down Al-Manar broadcasts.  Were the State Department to implement such practices, they would follow in the footsteps of Israel and China.  Incidentally, there is already plenty of suspicion in the Arab blogosphere that the U.S. does pay commenters to surreptitiously engage in discussion, so were it to actually be implemented, it’s possible that Palestinian netizens would be wary enough not to fall for it.

I don’t see how this is in the spirit of democracy.  It seems to be that an institution that claims to defend democracy would consider it wise to honor Palestinian agency, but hey, what do I know?

Wong decided that Google, by using a technique called I.P. blocking, would prevent access to videos that clearly violated Turkish law, but only in Turkey. For a time, her solution seemed to satisfy the Turkish judges, who restored YouTube access.

This morning, reports have emerged from Israel suggesting that the same is happening there. A video, released yesterday and entitled “Video Killed Israeli PR”, has been reported inaccessible by Israelis all morning:

A closer look determines that the video, which parodies Israel’s public relations, is perfectly accessible in the United States, and elsewhere…except in Israel. Ali Abunimah, who caught the story early on, writes:

After receiving an initial report that the video could not be viewed in Israel, I asked a contact there to check and he replied that when he attempted to view it on YouTube: “This video is not available in your country due to terms of use violation.” The screenshot below sent by http://twitter.com/AbuKedem shows what happens when someone in Israel tries to view the video:

Though no word from YouTube just yet (a few folks have sent out e-mails), it seems very likely that YouTube has blocked the video within Israel at the request of the Israeli government. It is unclear whether or not the video violates local laws.

A recent case in Israel has stunned and baffled many; as the story goes, a young Arab man introduces himself as “Dudu” (his family nickname, but also a comment nickname for David) to an Israeli Jewish woman on the street.  Shortly thereafter, they have sex, at which point he ditches her while she’s still getting dressed and leaves.  According to most news sources, upon finding out the man was in fact an Arab and not a Jew, the woman called rape.

I’m incredibly sensitive to rape charges, and particularly, have advocated in the past to release the burden of proof from the victim (meaning instead that the perpetrator would have to prove that he didn’t commit the crime).  I’m also incredibly sensitive to the issue of calling a woman promiscuous in rape cases; women who have had multiple sexual partners are very often devalued as defendants in rape cases, deemed to have been “asking for it.”  In any case, in the below, I am working from the assumption–provided to me by the Israeli media and the victim’s testimony–that this “rape” did not involve force and is in fact solely deemed rape because the man was not up front about his ethnicity.

That said, my issue is not with the defendant (who, for all we know, may have actually been raped).  My issue is with the logistics of the case, and particularly with the judge’s ruling.

The judge, Tzvi Segal, stated that a rape conviction could be upheld when:

“a person does not tell the truth regarding critical matters to a reasonable woman”

The judge also stated:

“If she hadn’t thought the accused was a Jewish bachelor interested in a serious romantic relationship, she would not have cooperated.”

The implication here is that the defendant thought that the man slept with only a few minutes after meeting was a Jewish bachelor interested in a serious romantic relationship, and that, had she known he was of a different race, she never would’ve considered intercourse.  Perhaps more importantly, the court seems to have ruled that a reasonable Jewish woman would not have had sex with an Arab, presumably based solely on the fact of his ethnicity alone.

Problematically, much of the media coverage has implied, through headlines, that the man lied to the woman by saying that he was Jewish, when based on his testimony, it was actually a lie by omission.  Morally dubious?  Perhaps, but when you jump into bed with someone five minutes after meeting them, you should reasonably expect that a whole lot of information has been omitted.  You are unlikely to know your partner’s line of work, his marital status (the man was also married, incidentally), even their HIV status.

Given the general consensus in Israel on intermarriage (the latter half of Robert Mackey’s Lede Blog post today gives a good description), perhaps our man is simply being held as a scapegoat, a warning to Arab men that choose to get involved with Israeli women.  Or perhaps Israelis are finding other means, given this morning’s news item about an Arab man attacked for simply talking to a Jewish woman.

Not that it should matter.

When I heard this news, I immediately thought of my friend and co-blogger Mohammad Alsaafin, whose family’s story I wrote about last year. Mohammad’s father was born in Gaza, his mother in the West Bank, where their children were also later born. The whole family possesses British passports, but that doesn’t matter to Israel; his mother, who despite being born in the West Bank possesses a Gaza ID card (thanks to her marriage), is considered an illegal immigrant in her own land.

Thus, I wasn’t surprised when Mohammad wrote about it a few days later. Here are some of his elegant words:

My mother is an illegal infiltrator. She has infiltrated her hometown, where her parents were born and where she was raised. Her activities as an infiltrator are as varied as they are nefarious: She takes my sister to school, with the neighbor’s kids. She cooks and cleans her home. We actually purchased that home so that she would have a base to operate from once she had infiltrated. She goes to the gym (I suspect infiltrators probably do need to stay in shape). She visits her sisters; I can’t say for sure if they assist her illegal activities. I’m sure they provide moral support at least. She helps care for her brother’s young children. You see my uncle might have been an infiltrator. They kicked him out of his homeland too, said he didn’t have the right permit to live there. He actually did, but they didn’t want to renew it. He was kept away from his kids for years. Eventually, he was given permission to infiltrate again, but he died a few months later, before this ruling came into effect. So maybe he became an infiltrator posthumously. I don’t know.

I’m not sure when my mother stopped being a member of the community she grew up in, or a resident of the town where she was raised. Maybe it was when she fell in love with a dangerous inmate. It wasn’t a maximum security prison back in those days-he’d actually been allowed to leave Gaza to study. They met in university: she the future infiltrator, he the future prisoner. They were in love, with each other and with Palestine. And love is what screwed them up.

You can read the rest of his piece, of course. Mohammad’s father’s story was also told today in Canada’s Globe and Mail:

When Abdullah Alsaafin said goodbye to his wife last August, he didn’t know it might be for the last time. The couple and three of their four children live in Ramallah in the West Bank, home of Mrs. Alsaafin’s family, and Mr. Alsaafin was leaving to visit his ailing father in Gaza.

Mr. Alsaafin, a British citizen and working journalist, had travelled frequently back and forth between the territories. On this occasion, however, he was stopped by Israeli authorities who learned he had been born in Gaza. They revoked his press credentials, said his passport was worthless, that he had (Israeli-issued) Gaza identification and was not entitled to live in the West Bank. He was ushered into Gaza and not allowed to leave.

Abdullah Alsaafin left Gaza last year and is currently residing in another country.

Dissident Voice has also covered the story:

But what if both your parents were born in Jaffa, but they ended up being refugees in Gaza? You still get deported to Gaza because you’re not Jewish. What if your mother was a refugee from Nazareth who took refuge in Bethlehem and your father was born in Jerusalem but ended up in a refugee camp in Gaza. You’re still deportable – because you’re not Jewish. There are all kinds of possibilities if you’re not Jewish

I don’t know how anyone can read the facts of this story and not see apartheid. Separate rules for Jews and Arabs (except those Arabs who choose to comply of course; the Druze and the Bedouins, not even considered Arabs by the Zionist government, and even then they’re discriminated against).

To where exactly does one deport a Palestinian? How can a Palestinian illegally live in Palestine? And why should Israel care at all what goes on in the West Bank?

A few years ago, before I became involved in advocacy work, I genuinely believed in the Western solution to the conflict in Israel/Palestine: I thought that eventually, and with some pushing and shoving, two countries would be declared, and with a bit of shaking of course, Israel and Palestine would live together, neighbors at last.

How horribly wrong I was. It becomes more apparent to me every day that the Israeli government has no such intentions. Pushing Palestinians out of what ought to be Palestine (and I’m only referring to 1967 borders!) indicates that Israel has decided that the West Bank will be theirs. And of course they have! How could I have ever thought otherwise?

The more Israel pushes Palestinians out and makes room for more settlers, the more I believe that one, single, bi-national, equal, call-it-whatever-you-want state is the only solution.